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Notes & Comments
Assignment of Rents Clauses under California Law
and in Bankruptcy: Strategy for the Secured
Creditor
By Randy Rogers*
Commercial mortgages and deeds of trust' commonly contain
clauses that provide for an "assignment" of the rents and profits of the
mortgaged property to the lender.2 These clauses are designed to give
* B.A., 1977, University of California at Santa Cruz. Member, Third Year Class.
1. A mortgage is a lien on property which secures performance of an act or payment
of a debt. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2920,2924, 2948 (West 1974). Seegenerally G. OSBORNE,
G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW (1979) [hereinafter cited as OS-
BORNE]. In California a mortgage does not transfer title but gives the mortgagee a security
interest only. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2888, 2926 (West 1974). California thus follows the
lien theory of mortgages as opposed to the title theory. See generally OSBORNE, supra, at
§§ IA-.5. The mortgage is generally a two-party transaction. The deed of trust, in contrast,
is generally a three-party transaction in which the debtor (the trustor), to secure payment of
the debt, grants legal title to a third party (the trustee) who holds that title for the benefit of
the creditor (the beneficiary). The deed of trust serves the same function as a mortgage and
there is little practical difference between the two. Id. at § 1.6; Domarad v. Fisher & Burke,
Inc., 270 Cal. App. 2d 543, 553, 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535 (1969).
The deed of trust has become California's predominant real property security device
through a historical anomaly. An early case, Koch v. Briggs, 14 Cal. 256 (1859), held that
because of certain formal differences between a mortgage and a deed of trust, the latter
would not be subject to the debtor protection rules governing mortgages. Not surprisingly,
this led to the ascendancy of the deed of trust and the eclipse of the mortgage. See R.
BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE § 3.3 (1979) [herein-
after cited as BERNHARDT]. Koch, however, essentially was overturned in Bank of Italy
Nat'I Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Bentley, 217 Cal. 644, 20 P.2d 940, cert. denied, 290 U.S. 659
(1933). In that case, the supreme court held that because the economic functions of the two
instruments were the same, the rights and duties of the parties should also be the same. Id.
at 657-58, 20 P.2d at 945. The advantage of the deed of trust to the creditor thus disap-
peared. Nonetheless, m California the deed of trust has continued to be the favored form of
security interest in real property. See BERNHARDT, supra, § 3.3.
2. Assignment of rents clauses have the same effect in mortgages and in deeds of trust.
In California the possessory rights of the parties to each type of instrument are the same.
Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 260, 115 P.2d 450, 452 (1941);
Snyder v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., I Cal. 2d 697, 701, 37 P.2d 86, 88 (1934). See
Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 270 Cal. App. 2d 543, 553, 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535 (1969).
Consequently, the terms "mortgages" and "deeds of trust" are used interchangeably in this
[1433]
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the lender3 a lien upon the rents and profits in addition to its lien upon
the underlying property. The validity and scope of these security inter-
ests may come into question in bankruptcy cases. Because substantial
rents and profits can accumulate during the administration of bank-
ruptcy cases, they may be claimed by both the secured creditor, seeking
to apply them to the amount of its deficit, and the bankruptcy trustee,
seeking to recover them for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The
Supreme Court recently discussed assignment of rents clauses in Burner
v. United States,4 declaring that state law controls the validity and
scope of security interests,5 including assignment of rents clauses, in
bankruptcy cases. 6
In California an assignment of rents clause may be either absolute,
absolute conditional upon the happening of a specified event such as
default, or a pledge of the postdefault rents as further security for the
obligation. 7 An absolute assignment immediately transfers to the
lender the right to receive rents from the encumbered property during
the term of the mortgage or trust deed. Such an assignment, however,
is rarely taken by the lender." The lender normally does not want the
Note. Similarly, while the assignments usually are labeled "assignment of rents and profits."
there is no distinction between the treatment accorded "rents" and that accorded "profits."
For covenience, such provisions will be referred to in this Note simply as "assignment of
rents clauses." Crops, however, are subject to different rules and the principles discussed in
this Note do not necessarily apply to crops. See United States v. Giragossiantz, 488 F.2d
358 (9th Cir. 1973); Pollack v. Sampsell, 174 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1949); Smith, Security Inter-
ests in Crops, 10 HASTINGS L.J. (pts. 1-2) 23, 156 (1958).
3. For convenience, the terms "lender" and "borrower" are used interchangeably in
this Note with the terms "creditor" and "debtor" respectively. It should be noted, however,
that a deed of trust does not always involve a loan of money. A trust deed may be given to
secure performance of an obligation other than the payment of a debt. See generally note I
supra. Similarly, in discussions of bankruptcy, the beneficiary of a trust deed will be re-
ferred to as the "secured creditor" to distinguish it from unsecured creditors.
4. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Butner is discussed in detail at notes 23-36 & accompanying
text infra.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (Supp. 11 1978) defines "security interest" as a "lien created by
agreement." Lien is defined as a "charge against or interest in property to secure payment of
a debt or performance of an obligation." Id. § 10 1(28). The statutory definitions do not
distinguish between real and personal property and thus, for purposes of bankruptcy, the
term "security interest" applies to both real and personal property.
6. The application of state law to determine the postpetition effect of a security agree-
ment is circumscribed by I 1 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 11 1978). See notes 37-48 & accompanying
text infra.
7. See notes 74-103 & accompanying text infra. See generally BERNHARDT, supra note
1, §§ 7.10-.11; J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 2.12
(1970); J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 5.3 (1974); J. HETLAND, SE-
CURED REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS §§ 5.3-.4 (1977); 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CUR-
RENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE §§ 3.33-.35 (1975).
8. See BERNHARDT, sufpra note 1, § 7.10; J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SE-
CURED TRANSACTIONS § 2.12. (1970).
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burden of collecting the rents absent a default on the obligation and the
borrower usually prefers to collect the rents during the term of the loan.
The other two types of assignment clauses are used more fre-
quently9 and are the subject of this Note. The absolute assignment
conditional upon default, hereinafter referred to as an absolute assign-
ment, provides that rents are assigned immediately upon execution of
the mortgage or deed of trust, subject to the right of the borrower to
collect the rents until an event of default occurs, at which time the
lender's right to collect the rents automatically arises. t0 In contrast, the
pledge of postdefault rents, commonly called an assignment of rents for
security purposes, does not immediately assign any interest in rents.
Rather, it creates only a prospective or inchoate lien in favor of the
lender which must be "perfected ' "I after the borrower's default before
the lender is entitled to the rents.' 2 The lender can perfect this lien
either by taking possession of the encumbered property or by obtaining
the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents for its benefit.'
3
The distinction between these two types of assignments can be-
come critical during bankruptcy cases. Upon the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy, the lender is automatically stayed from taking possession
of the debtor's property or obtaining the appointment of a receiver;
14
9. See BERNHARDT, supra note 1, § 7.10.
10. See In re Ventura-Louise Properties, 490 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1974); Kinnison v.
Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941). See notes 74-83, 103-123
& accompanying text infra.
11. The term "perfection," as used by the California courts when discussing assignment
of rents clauses, differs from the meaning given that term by Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The two meanings should not be confused. Under Article 9 a security agree-
ment is enforceable between the parties without the necessity of perfection. U.C.C. § 9-201.
Perfection puts third parties on notice of the encumbrance of the debtor's property and en-
ables the creditor to gain priority over certain third parties. See U.C.C. § 9-30 1. As used in
the context of assignment of rents clauses, however, perfection is the step necessary for the
creditor to enforce the lien against the debtor. Until the prospective lien on rents is per-
fected, the debtor remains entitled to all rents that it can collect. See notes 52-64 & accom-
panying text infra. A perfected lien, although valid against the debtor, nevertheless is
subject to subordination in favor of a subsequently perfected senior lien. Childs v. Shel-
burne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943); Carlon v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 2d
17, 38 P.2d 149 (1934). See generally BERNHARDT, supra note 1, §§ 7.19-.31. Thus, perfec-
tion as used in this context describes the actions that a lienor must take to be entitled to the
rents vis-a-vis the debtor. The relative priority among competing perfected lienors is deter-
mined by priority of the mortgage or trust deed. Id.
12. Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 268, 143 P.2d 697, 700 (1943);
Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 261, 115 P.2d 450, 452-53 (1941);
Lee v. Ski Run Apts. Assocs., 249 Cal. App. 2d 293, 297, 57 Cal. Rptr. 496, 499 (1967). See
notes 52-64 & accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 52-64 & accompanying text infra.
14. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. 111978). See generally P. MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN
BANKRUPTCY §§ 6-01 to 6-17 (1979); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11362.01-.11 (15th ed.
1979); Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 3
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thus, the lender is prevented from perfecting its security interest in
rents. Butner, however, directs that a mortgagee's rights in bankruptcy
should be equivalent to the rights it would have had under state law
had bankruptcy not intervened. Accordingly, the mortgagee is not enti-
tled to postpetition rents until it has taken action in bankruptcy court
that approximates the steps it must take under state law to be entitled
to the rents. This bankruptcy court action often has taken the form of
petitioning for a sequestration of the rents.' 5
California law is unclear on whether an absolute assignment of
rents must be perfected for the lender to be entitled to receive the
rents.' 6 Theoretically, it need not be because the assignment by its
terms is immediate and collection rights of the lender arise automati-
cally upon default. Yet the precise question has not been considered by
the California courts. If the interest need not be perfected, the secured
creditor can avoid the troublesome and occasionally unsuccessful at-
tempt to have the rents sequestered. Additionally, the secured creditor
may be entitled to all rents collected by the bankruptcy trustee from the
date of the filing of bankruptcy rather than from the date the appropri-
ate action is taken in bankruptcy court.17 An absolute assignment thus
would be a significant advantage to the secured creditor if the debtor
enters bankruptcy.' 8
This Note examines assignment of rents clauses under California
law and in bankruptcy cases applying California law. It first discusses
Butner v. United States19 and concludes that the rule in that case con-
tinues to be valid under the new Bankruptcy Code.20 The Note then
analyzes the treatment of assignment of rents clauses under California
law and discusses the steps secured creditors having either an assign-
(1978). For a discussion of the automatic stay provisions under the old Bankruptcy Act (see
note 20 infra), see Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 177
(1978); Peitzman & Smith, The Secured Creditor's Complaint:. Reiieffom the Automatic
Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 1216 (1977).
15. Historically, the other options available to the secured creditor have been either
obtaining the appointment of a receiver or obtaining the court's consent to foreclose. See,
e.g., Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 506 F.2d 1242, 1243 (4th Cir. 1974); Central
States Life Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 98 F.2d 102, 105 (10th Cir. 1938). Under the new Bankruptcy
Code, see note 20 infra, however, it appears that the trustee no longer has the power to
appoint a receiver.
16. See notes 68-72 & accompanying text infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 167-68 infra.
18. See text accompanying 167-68 infra.
19. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
20. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 ("Bank-
ruptcy Code" or "Code"), which went into effect on October 1, 1979, codifies and enacts title
11 of the United States Code. The Code supersedes the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30
Stat. 544 ("Bankruptcy Act" or "Act"). All cases mentioned in this Note were decided under
the Act.
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ment for security purposes or an absolute assignment must take to be
entitled to receive the rents. The Note then demonstrates how an abso-
lute assignment may be distinguished from an assignment for security
purposes and formulates recommendations for lenders attempting to
draft an absolute assignment. Finally, the Note examines the effect of
each type of assignment of rents clause in bankruptcy 2' cases applying
California law. It discusses the actions that secured creditors have
taken in bankruptcy court under the Act, and suggests what action se-
cured creditors should take under the Code, to perfect their right to
rents.22
Butner v. United States
In Butner v. United States23 the Supreme Court resolved a dispute
among the circuit courts of appeal over the law to be applied in deter-
mining who is entitled to rents collected on mortgaged property be-
tween the date of the mortgagor's bankruptcy petition and the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property. Five circuits, including the
Ninth, had applied state law to determine whether a security interest in
property extends to rents collected during bankruptcy proceedings.
24
Two circuits had employed a federal rule of equity that gave a mortga-
gee a security interest in rents regardless of whether such a right existed
under state law.25 A unanimous Supreme Court agreed with the ma-
jority view and held that state law will determine the scope of security
21. The effect of assignment of rents clauses in bankruptcy has received scattered atten-
tion from legal commentators over the years. See Abelow, An HistoricalAnasis of Assign-
ments of Rent in New York, 6 BROOKLYN L. REV. 25 (1936); Gose, The Efficacy of an
Assignment of Rents and Profts in Bankruptcy, 12 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 507 (1977);
Comment, The Mortgagee's Right to Rents and Profits Following a Petition in Bankruptcy, 60
IOWA L. REV. 1388 (1975); Comment, The Mortgagee's Right to RentsAfter Default, 50 YALE_
L.J. 1424 (1941).
22. A secured creditor with a valid, perfected assignment of rents will not necessarily
receive those rents if the debtor goes into bankruptcy. Various provisions of the Code sub-
ject a creditor's interest in rents to certain powers granted to the trustee. These powers are
discussed in more detail at notes 167, 172-73 infra.
23. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
24. The Court in Butner stated that the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits had applied state law. Id. at 52 n.2. The cases cited are Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co.
v. Williams, 506 F.2d 1242 (4th Cir. 1974); In re American Fuel & Power Co., 151 F.2d 47C
(6th Cir. 1945); Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinstein, 119 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1941);
In re Hotel St. James Co., 65 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1933); In re Brose, 254 F. 664 (2d Cir. 1918).
See also Central States Life Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 98 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1938); Dallas Trust &
Say. Bank v. Ledbetter, 36 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1929).
25. The Court stated that the Third and Seventh Circuits had applied a federal rule of
equity. The cases cited are In re Pittsburgh-Duquesne Dev. Co., 482 F.2d 243 (3d Cir.
1973); In re Wakey, 50 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 193 1); Bindseil v. Liberty Trust Co., 248 F. 112 (3d
Cir. 1917). See also Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal &
Iron Co., 99 F.2d 642 (3d Cir. 1938).
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interests in bankruptcy proceedings. 26
Butner involved a dispute between a bankruptcy trustee and a sec-
ond mortgagee over the right to rents collected by the trustee between
adjudication and foreclosure. The debtor in Butner filed a petition
under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Shortly thereafter the bank-
ruptcy judge appointed an agent to collect the rents and apply them as
directed by the court. The plan of arrangement was never confirmed
and the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt. A trustee was appointed
and ordered to collect the rents. The trustee made no payments on the
mortgages, which were then in default.
Foreclosure of the mortgaged property did not satisfy the claim of
the second mortgagee, who then claimed a security interest in the rents.
This claim was denied by the bankruptcy judge but granted by the dis-
trict court on appeal. The district court, while recognizing that the
right to rents under North Carolina law is an incident of possession,
considered the appointment of an agent to collect rents during the pen-
dency of the Chapter XI proceeding to be equivalent to the appoint-
ment of a receiver.2 7 It reasoned that no further action by the
mortgagee was necessary after conversion of the Chapter XI proceed-
ing into straight bankruptcy.2 8 The Fourth Circuit reversed2 9 and held
that dismissal of the agent upon adjudication made it incumbent upon
the mortgagee to take further action, by petitioning either for a seques-
tration of the rents or for the appointment of a receiver, to secure its
rights to the rents.30
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision but did not consider
what a mortgagee must do to perfect an interest in rents under North
Carolina law. It considered only whether the Fourth Circuit was cor-
rect in deciding to apply state law to determine the existence of a secur-
ity interest in bankruptcy. In approving the application of state law,
the Supreme Court disapproved the equity approach of the Third and
Seventh Circuits. 3' This federal rule of equity automatically gave the
mortgagee a postpetition security interest in rents regardless of whether
such an interest would be recognized under state law. This equitable
lien was considered fair because the bankruptcy court had taken pos-
session of the property upon filing of the petition and thus deprived the
mortgagee of its ability to perfect the security interest in state court.
The Supreme Court rejected this approach, however, primarily be-
cause it often led to a mortgagee's obtaining greater rights in the bank-
26. 440 U.S. at 54-55.
27. See id. at 51.
28. See id.
29. Golden Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 566 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1977).
30. Id. at 1210.
31. See note 25 supra.
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ruptcy court that it would be entitled to in a comparable state court
proceeding. 32 The Court did note that Congress has the power to fash-
ion a uniform rule governing the extent of a mortgagee's interest in
rents in a bankruptcy proceeding,33 but also noted that when Congress
has not exercised that power the determination of property interests in
a bankruptcy proceeding must be left to state law.
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless
some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason
why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform
treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts
within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum
shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving "a windfall merely
by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy."
4
The Court determined that the federal equity rule did not serve any
identifiable federal interest. Equity, the Court said, is best achieved by
ensuring that the same results obtain in bankruptcy as would obtain in
a comparable state court proceeding.35 The bankruptcy judge can ac-
complish this by requiring the mortgagee to take steps in bankruptcy
court approximating the steps which that mortgagee would have had to
take in state court to be entitled to rents after default. The Court sug-
gested that by sequestering rents or by authorizing immediate state law
foreclosure, the bankruptcy judge can prevent any loss the mortgagee
might otherwise suffer by being denied its right to obtain possession
under state law.36
Continuing Validity of Butner
The validity of the rule in Butner should remain unchanged by
adoption of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 552(b) of the new Code pro-
vides that a security agreement granting an interest in rents, entered
into by the debtor prior to commencement of the bankruptcy case will
be valid to the extent provided by the agreement and by applicable
nonbankruptcy law.37 Section 552(b) also provides, however, that the
32. 440 U.S. at 56.
33. Id. at 54.
34. Id. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)).
35. 440 U.S. at 56.
36. Id. at 57.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. 111978). Section 552 in its entirety provides as follows:
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, property acquired by the estate
or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from
any security agreement entered into by the debtor before the commencement of the case.
"(b) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 544, 545, 547, and 548 of this title, if the
debtor and a secured party enter into a security agreement before the commencement of the
case and if the security interest created by such security agreement extends to property of the
debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to proceeds, product, offspring,
July 1980] ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS
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bankruptcy court may contravene the terms of a valid security interest
if equity so requires.38 This qualification, on its face, seems to alter the
rule in Butner by giving bankruptcy courts the equitable discretion
which the Supreme Court had taken away in that case. Despite this
language, an examination of rationale underlying the Butner decision
and the legislative history of section 552 and its equitable exception
indicates that application of state law is mandated under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.
In Butner, the Supreme Court recognized the power of Congress to
create uniform laws determining property rights in bankruptcy,3 9 but
stressed that Congress generally has left this question to state law.
40
The reluctance of Congress to enact uniform laws determining property
rights in bankruptcy reflects Congress' general view that property rights
are a matter of state law and that the "mere happenstance" of bank-
ruptcy should not alter the state law result.41 Accordingly, the Bank-
ruptcy Act did not explicitly determine the precise postpetition effect of
security interests. Consequently, the Act did not preempt state laws
controlling the validity and scope of security interests.
Section 552 of the new Code essentially codifies Congress' defer-
ence to state law in this area. Section 552(a) provides that property
acquired by the debtor's estate after commencement of the bankruptcy
case will not be subject to any lien created by a security agreement
executed prior to filing.42 Section 552(b), however, creates a broad ex-
ception to this rule in favor of security interests in "proceeds, product,
offspring, rents, or profits" of encumbered property.43 Although
designed primarily to allow creditors to take security interests in pro-
ceeds pursuant to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the sec-
tion extends to security interests in real property as well.44 Section 552
rents, or profits of such property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds, prod-
uct, offspring, rents, or profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to
the extent provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law, ex-
cept to the extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the
case, orders otherwise." Id. § 552 (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 552(b), quoted in note 37 supra.
39. 440 U.S. at 54. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have authority to
establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
40. 440 U.S. at 54.
41. Id. at 54-55.
42. I1 U.S.C. § 552(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
43. Id. § 552(b).
44. "Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Article 9, creditors may take security inter-
ests in after-acquired property. This section governs the effect of such a prepetition security
interest in postpetition property. It applies to all security interests as defined in section 101
of the bankruptcy code, not only to U.C.C. security interests." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 376 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6332
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is thus consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court in Butner, in
which the Court held that a mortgagee has a right to postpetition rents
once it has taken steps to obtain the rent in bankruptcy court that ap-
proximate the steps it must have taken under state law had there been
no bankruptcy.45
As mentioned, section 552(b) also provides that the bankruptcy
court, "based on the equities of the case," may deviate from the general
rule requiring application of state law.46 The legislative history of sec-
tion 552, however, reveals that this equity exception was intended to
encompass a situation distinctly different from an assignment of rents
and was not intended to resurrect the federal equity rule applied by the
Third and Seventh Circuits prior to Butner. The House Report states
that the purpose of the exception was to cover situations in which the
expenditure of the estate's funds results in an increase in value of the
collateral.47 For instance, where raw materials are turned into more
valuable inventory or inventory into more valuable accounts, to the ex-
tent that funds of the estate are used the funds available for general
unsecured creditors are directly depleted. 4 In such situations it would
be inequitable to benefit the secured party at the expense of unsecured
creditors.
Collection of rents differs in part from the above examples because
it involves little expense to the estate. Any administrative expenses in-
volved in collecting rents can be routinely charged against the value of
those rents under section 506(c). 49 In addition, the collection of rents
does not result in any increase in value of the collateral. Thus, the
equity exception provided in section 552(b) should not be applicable to
rents. The general rule of section 552(b), and of Butner, should deter-
[hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 95-595]. See also S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 91 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5877 thereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 95-989]. For the Bankruptcy Code definition of security interest, see
note 5 supra.
45. 440 U.S. at 56.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
47. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 44, at 376-77.
48. This example is given by both the House and Senate reports. H.R. REP. No. 95-
595, supra note 44, at 376-77; S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 44, at 91. In explanation of the
compromise bill on the House floor it was noted that the equity exception allows the bank-
ruptcy court to "evaluate any expenditures by the estate relating to proceeds and any related
improvement in position of the secured party." 124 CONG. REc. 11,097-98 (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); see 124 CONG. REc. 17,414 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. DeConcini). This passage further suggests the necessity of both expense to
the estate and benefit to the creditor before the equity exception is applicable.
49. "The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the rea-
sonable, necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the
extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim." I 1 U.S.C. § 506(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
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mine rights to postpetition rents. 50
The Right to Post-Default Rents under California Law
In determining the right of a secured creditor to postpetition rents,
the bankruptcy court must thus look to state law. If a secured creditor
is not receiving rents prior to commencement of the debtor's bank-
ruptcy case, it must take action in bankruptcy court that approximates
the action it would have been required to take under state law to re-
ceive the rents. Consequently, assessing lenders' rights in bankruptcy to
postdefault rents in California necessitates examining California law
governing the perfection of security interests in rents.
The Right to Rents under an Assignment of Rents for Security Purposes
An assignment of rents for security purposes must be perfected
before a lender is entitled to receive the rents.51 To perfect such an
interest in California, a lender either must acquire possession of the
encumbered property or must obtain the appointment of a receiver to
collect the rents for its benefit.5 2 Once the interest is perfected, the
lender is entitled to any rents collected by it or by the receiver 3 be-
cause the right to rents is an incident of possession. Once a lender or
receiver is in possession, the lender becomes entitled to all unpaid
rents, regardless of when the right to those rents accrued. Similarly, the
trustor may retain any rents collected by it prior to the secured credi-
tor's obtaining possession.
That possession of the property or appointment of a receiver will
perfect a lien on rents is long established in California and has not been
questioned. 54 California courts have held that the beneficiary may take
50. The provision in § 552(b) allowing security interests to extend to property acquired
after commencement of the case is expressly made subject to the provisions of §§ 363, 506(c),
544, 545, 547, & 548 of title 11. None of these sections, however, would alter the general rule
discussed in the text. Section 363 deals with use, sale, or lease of property of the estate by
the trustee. II U.S.C. § 363 (Supp. 111978). The effect of this section is discussed more fully
at notes 170-71 infra. Section 506(c) merely allows the trustee to recover costs of preserving
secured property from the property itself. Id. § 506(c). Sections 544, 545, & 547 deal respec-
tively with the trustee's rights as a lien creditor, the trustee's right to avoid the fixing of a
statutory lien, and the trustee's right to avoid a preference. Id. §§ 544, 545, 547. Section 548
deals with fraudulent transfers and obligations. Id. § 548.
51. See notes 11-13 & accompanying text supra.
52. Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 268, 143 P.2d 697, 700 (1943). See
note 54 & accompanying text infra.
53. See notes 62-65 & accompanying text infra.
54. "It is settled that where a mortgage or deed of trust contains a clause which merely
includes the rents as a portion of the property pledged to secure a debt, only a security
interest passes. And until a mortgagee obtains lawful possession, the mortgagor in posses-
sion may collect the rents as they fall due. Or, to put it another way, the mortgagee must
actually acquire possession of the mortgaged property by consent or lawful procedure or
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possession by notifying the tenants to pay rent to it-5 or by appointing
an agent to collect the rents.56 This agent can be the trustor's property
manager57 or even the trustor. 58 The beneficiary also may perfect its
lien by demanding that the trustor turn over to it all rents collected by
the trustor. A demand for rents, however, is sufficient only if the trus-
tor cooperates and actually turns over the rents.59
Should the tenants or the trustor be uncooperative and refuse to
turn over the rents or give up possession, the beneficiary must take
court action to perfect its right to rents. Early cases held that if prompt
legal action were taken, the date of the unsuccessful demand for posses-
sion would be considered the date the interest was perfected.60 More
recent cases, however, have declined to follow this rule though they
have neither disapproved nor distinguished the earlier cases. 6' The
leading case in this regard is Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 6 2 in which
the California Supreme Court stated the general rule that a lien on
rents and profits is not perfected until possession actually is taken or a
receiver appointed.63 The lender in Childs obtained possession immedi-
ately upon demand, however, so the supreme court had no reason to
apply that general rule to a situation where the lender was initially re-
fused possession. Nonetheless, the rule stated by the court is quite
must secure the appointment of a receiver in order to perfect his claim to the rents." Childs
v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 268, 143 P.2d 697, 700 (1943) (citing Freedman's
Say. & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494 (1888)); Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating
Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941); Freeman v. Campbell, 109 Cal. 360, 42 P. 35
(1895); Casey v. Doherty, 116 Cal. App. 42, 2 P.2d 495 (1931)).
55. See Johns v. Moore, 168 Cal. App. 2d 709, 336 P.2d 579 (1959).
56. Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943); Snyder v.
Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 1 Cal. 2d 697, 37 P.2d 86 (1934).
57. Snyder v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., I Cal. 2d 697, 37 P.2d 86 (1934).
58. Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943).
59. See BERNHARDT, supra note 1, § 7.12.
60. In Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Monson, 11 Cal. 2d 621, 81 P.2d 944 (1938), the
beneficiary demanded that the trustor turn over possession to it pursuant to the assignment
of rents clause contained in the deed of trust. The trustor refused and the beneficiary
brought suit to gain possession of the property. The beneficiary never sought to have a
receiver appointed. Nine months later the beneficiary obtained possession. It then sued to
obtain the rents collected during the interim. The trial court awarded the beneficiary dam-
ages in the amount of all rents collected by the trustor from the time the beneficiary first
demanded possession until the trustor was ousted from the property. The case was appealed
on other grounds and the judgment was upheld.
Aonson was followed in Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Sampsell, 51 Cal. App. 2d 180, 124
P.2d 353 (1942). The trustor in Mortgage Guarantee refused the beneficiary's demand for
possession. Six days later the beneficiary had a receiver appointed. The court of appeal,
citing Monson, held that the beneficiary was entitled to the rents collected from the date it
demanded possession. Id. at 190, 124 P.2d at 358.
61. See notes 62-64 & accompanying text infra.
62. 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943).
63. Id. at 268, 143 P.2d at 700.
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clear, and Childs apparently has stood for the proposition that only
actual possession or appointment of a receiver will perfect a security
interest in rents.64
Thus, where a demand for possession is refused by the trustor, the
beneficiary ought to seek the appointment of a receiver immediately. If
this is not done, the lien on rents has not been perfected and the trustor
may continue to collect the rents. Once the beneficiary takes posses-
sion, it is entitled to all rents which it thereafter collects, while the trus-
tor may retain all rents it collected before the beneficiary acquired
possession. The time at which the right to those rents accrued is imma-
terial; possession is the determining factor.65
64. Lee v. Ski Run Apts. Assocs., 249 Cal. App. 2d 293, 57 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1967), and
Malsman v. Brandler, 230 Cal. App. 2d 922,41 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964), both followed this rule
without discussion. See generally Regalia, Receivers in California Litigation Involving Real
Property, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 896, 905-10 (1968).
65. In 1942, the court of appeal in Mortgage Guarantee v. Sampsell, 51 Cal. App. 2d
180, 124 P.2d 353 (1942), compelled a receiver to return to the trustor all ents collected by
the receiver which accrued prior to his appointment. But the following year the supreme
court in Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943), without men-
tioning Mortgage Guarantee, held exactly the opposite and allowed the secured creditor to
keep rents it collected which had accrued prior to the time it took possession. The supreme
court surprisingly treated the issue as one of first impression. It noted a split on the question
in other jurisdictions but held that "it would be inequitable if, after [the secured creditor]
had established its lien by taking possession of the property, [the debtor] were allowed to
collect and use the [rents] without discharging its obligation to [the secured creditor]. Such a
result would defeat the lien." Id. at 270, 143 P.2d at 700-01. It is surprising that Childs, in
essentially overruling Mortgage Guarantee, did not mention that decision or try to distin-
guish it. Childs centered around a complex fact situation involving both a deed of trust and
a lease, and the issue on appeal involved rents under the lease. There is little doubt, how-
ever, that the supreme court intended its conclusion to apply to deeds of trust as well. It
used the terms lessee and mortgagee interchangeably. See id. at 269-70, 143 P.2d at 700.
The cases it cited on this point all dealt with mortgages and deeds of trust rather than leases.
Finally, the language used by the court is so broad that it squarely covers mortgages and
trust deeds. See id. Childs has been cited repeatedly as applying to both. See cases cited
note 64 supra. No subsequent case has dealt with this issue, and the rule in Childs appears
to be followed routinely. Nonetheless, Santacroce Bros. v. Edgewater-Santa Clara, Inc., 242
Cal. App. 584, 51 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1966), contains the following language: "We have no doubt
as to the right of the court in the present situation to appoint a receiver to enter upon and
take possession of the subject property for the purpose of collecting the rents thereafter accru-
ing thereon." Id. at 586, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (citing Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating
Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941); Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Monson, 11 Cal. 2d
621, 81 P.2d 944 (1938); Snyder v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 1 Cal. 2d 697, 37 P.2d 86
(1934)) (emphasis added). The language emphasized seems to indicate a result contrary to
that reached in Childs. However, the point the court is trying to make in that paragraph is
that a court has the power to appoint a receiver to take possession of the property and collect
the rents. The authorities it cites all state this point. None of them considered whether
perfection of a security interest in rents covers rents accrued but uncollected at the time of
possession. Indeed, all three were decided prior to Mortgage Guarantee and Childs. The
emphasized language, therefore, is most likely just a poor choice of words and was not
meant to suggest that accrued but uncollected rents belong to the trustor.
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The Right to Rents under an Absolute Assignment
There is little judicial guidance on the question of the right to post-
default rents under an absolute assignment. The supreme court in Kin-
nison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp.,66 the only California case that has
held an assignment of rents clause to be absolute, did not reach the
question.67 Thus, it is difficult to predict exactly what a court would
require the holder of such an assignment to do to receive the rents from
the encumbered property. Accordingly, the beneficiary of an absolute
assignment is best advised to follow the steps required to perfect an
assignment for security purposes.
The language used by the supreme court in Kinnison suggests that
the secured creditor need take no action after default before it is enti-
tled to the rents:
The agreement between the parties, however, either by a clause in-
serted in the deed of trust or mortgage or by a separate instrument,
may provide that in the event of default the rents are assigned abso-
lutely to the mortgagee. It has been held that such a provision, rather
than pledging the rents as additional security, operates to transfer to
the mortgagee the mortgagor's right to the rentals upon the happening
of the specified condition.68
If the right to rents transfers automatically "upon the happening of [a]
specified condition," 69 the lender presumably need do nothing to estab-
lish its right to the rents. The lender's right to collect rents arises auto-
matically upon the debtor's default. Subsequent opinions citing the
dicta in Kinnison tend to support this contention. 70 The absolute as-
signment at issue in Kinnison, however, was not contained in the deed
of trust but was executed as a separate agreement after default and
gave the lender immediate possession.71 Consequently, the supreme
court did not determine whether the beneficiary of an absolute assign-
ment must take any action before it is entitled to the rents.
If the right to collect rents given by an absolute assignment is held
not to arise automatically upon default, the explicit language of the
above cases would seem to be contradicted. Yet there is no guarantee
66. 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941).
67. For further discussion of Kinnison, see notes 74-85 & accompanying text infra.
68. 18 Cal. 2d at 261, 115 P.2d at 453 (emphasis added).
69. Id.
70. Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943): "It is possible,
by the terms of a security arrangement, or in a separate agreement, for the parties to provide
that immediately on default rents are assigned absolutely." Id. at 268, 143 P.2d at 700 (em-
phasis added). Malsman v. Brandler, 230 Cal. App. 2d 922, 41 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964): "It is
also settled that the parties, either by a clause inserted in the deed or trust or by a separate
instrument, may provide that in the event of default the rents are assigned absolutely to the
beneficiary." Id. at 924, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 440 (emphasis added). See also In re Ventura-
Louise Properties, 490 F.2d 1141, 1143, 1145 n.1 (9th Cir. 1974).
71. See text accompanying notes 74-85 infra.
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that a California court, if confronted with the question, would hold that
no action on the part of the secured creditor is necessary for it to be
entitled to the rents. As mentioned earlier, the general rule regarding
assignments for security purposes is that the party who collects rents is
entitled to keep them regardless of who had the right to possession
when the rents accrued.72 In the cases discussed previously, the party
that had collected rents was held entitled to keep them. 73 In no case
was a trustor forced to turn over rents that it collected prior to its ouster
from the property. Thus while a California court might hold a creditor
need do nothing for its right to collect rents to arise, in accord with the
language in Kinnison, it might not hold that rents collected by the trus-
tor after the creditor's right arose must be turned over to the creditor by
the trustor. The creditor's right, therefore, would be meaningless ab-
sent some action by the creditor to acquire actual or constructive pos-
session. Perhaps California courts will require the secured creditor to
take some action less time-consuming and burdensome than obtaining
possession or the appointment of a receiver. They could require a de-
mand for possession or a demand for the rents, even though not suc-
cessful, or perhaps some form of notice to the debtor that the secured
creditor is seeking to exercise its right to the rents under its absolute
assignment.
Because of this uncertainty the secured creditor ought not to pre-
sume it need do nothing to be entitled to the rents. To be safe it should
make an immediate demand for the rents and, if this is refused, should
take the steps necessary to perfect an assignment for security purposes.
Distinguishing an Absolute Assignment of Rents from an
Assignment for Security Purposes under California
Law
Because of the dearth of case law concerning absolute assign-
ments, a lender cannot be certain that a particular clause will be
deemed an absolute assignment by the California courts. No Califor-
nia case has ever held an assignment of rents clause contained in a
mortgage or deed of trust to be an absolute assignment. In Kinnison v.
Guaranty Liquidating Corp.,7 4 where the existence of such a clause was
first recognized, the assignment was executed after default, thus provid-
ing limited guidance on how to draft an absolute assignment in a deed
of trust. Other California cases, however, have discussed the criteria
72. See notes 52-65 & accompanying text infra.
73. Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Sampsell, 51 Cal. App. 2d 180, 124 P.2d 353 (1942), is
the only exception. The result in that case, however, was overturned by Childs v. Shelburne
Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943). See note 65 supra.
74. 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941).
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necessary for an assignment of rents clause to be considered absolute.75
The following discussion of these opinions suggests that whether an
assignment is absolute or for security purposes is controlled by the in-
tent of the parties.76 In determining that intent, the wording and place-
ment of the clause within the deed of trust are the crucial factors.
The Kinnison case arose out of a dispute between a trust deed ben-
eficiary and a judgment creditor over certain rents collected by a build-
ing owner. To finance a building, the debtor, Bartlett Corporation,
borrowed $835,000 from Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company and
executed a deed of trust as security. Approximately three years later,
while Bartlett was in default under the first deed of trust, the parties
replaced it with a second deed of trust. Both deeds of trust were ac-
companied by assignments of the rents from a theater in Bartlett's
building as additional security for the loan. About two years after the
replacement of the first deed of trust, while Bartlett was again in de-
fault, the parties entered into two agreements. The first assigned to Pa-
cific Mutual all the rents accruing from the building, including rents
from offices and stores as well as the rents from the theater that had
already been assigned as additional security. This instrument provided:
Bartlett hereby (1) grants, transfers, assigns and sets over to the Pa-
cific Mutual Life Insurance Company of California. . . "said prop-
erty income, together with the right to collect and/or compromise the
same in whole or in part and/or to enforce the payment of all or any
part thereof ... as the insurance company may deem proper
".77
The second agreement provided that Bartlett would collect all
rents for the account and benefit of Pacific Mutual. Bartlett thereafter
collected the rents and deposited them in its own general account.
Monthly payments were made to Pacific Mutual in accordance with the
agreements, but the bank account was kept in Bartlett's name. Guar-
anty Liquidating Corporation, a judgment creditor of Bartlett, levied a
writ of execution on Bartlett's bank accounts and claimed the rents held
75. See notes 85-102 & accompanying text infra. Several pre-Kinnison cases considered
the effect of assignment of rents clauses in mortgages and deeds of trust. Title Guar. & Trust
Co. v. Monson, 11 Cal. 2d 621, 81 P.2d 944 (1938); Carlon v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 2d 17, 38
P.2d 149 (1934); Snyder v. Western Loan & Bldg. Co., 1 Cal. 2d 697, 37 P.2d 86 (1934); Bank
of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Bank of Amador County, 135 Cal. App. 714,28 P.2d
86 (1933). Some of these cases occasionally are cited as examples of absolute assignments.
See, e.g., I MILLER & STARR, .upra note 7, at 377 n.161. None of the pre-Kinnison cases,
however, used the term absolute assignment. Indeed, prior to Kinnison the concept of an
absolute assignment had not been recognized in California. All of the above cases treated
assignment of rents clauses in the only way conceivable at the time-as provisions for addi-
tional security. To characterize a pre-Kinnison case as an absolute assignment of rents
would be to attribute to it by hindsight a meaning it could not have had at the time.
76. See text accompanying notes 74-85 infra.
77. 18 Cal. 2d at 262-63, 115 P.2d at 453-54 (omissions by the court).
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in that account. The trial court found that the assignment clause was
valid and that the rents were held for the benefit of Pacific Mutual.
78
On appeal, the California Supreme Court considered the validity
of this assignment clause. The court first noted that clauses in mort-
gages that assign rents normally transfer only a security interest.
79
Under such circumstances, the mortgagee must first perfect its interest
in the rents, either by taking possession of the property or by securing
the appointment of a receiver, before it is entitled to receive the rents.80
However, the court stated:
the parties. . . may provide [instead] that in the event of default the
rents are assigned absolutely to the mortgagee. It has been held that
such a provision, rather than pledging the rents as additional secur-
ity, operates to transfer to the mortgagee the mortgagor's right to the
rentals upon the happening of the specified condition.81
Some jurisdictions, the court pointed out, refuse to enforce such
clauses either on the ground that the mortgagee's rights are governed
exclusively by state statutes or because the courts simply "are reluctant
to find that a complete transfer of the mortgagor's possessory rights was
intended despite the use of language of assignment rather than hypoth-
ecation."82 The better view, according to the court, is that such agree-
ments be enforced in accord with the intent of the parties: "The
decisive question is whether the parties contemplated an assignment of
the rentals or merely a pledge of the rentals for security purposes.
83
The court held the assignment in Kinnison to be an absolute as-
signment of the rents. The court emphasized several factors in making
this determination. Pacific Mutual had notified the tenants that their
rents had been assigned to it by Bartlett; Bartlett had collected those
rents for the benefit of Pacific Mutual and had paid them out to Pacific
Mutual; the instrument itself was phrased as a complete transfer of all
Bartlett's right to the rents; and, unlike the assignments executed along
with the trust deeds, there was no provision allowing the debtor to con-
tinue collecting rents until the happening of a specified condition. 84 In
addition, the court noted that Bartlett could not regain its right to re-
ceive rents. Instead, the right to rents was given up completely, in par-
tial satisfaction of the outstanding indebtedness to Pacific Mutual.
85
78. See id. at 259, 115 P.2d at 452.
79. Id. at 261, 115 P.2d at 452-53.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 261, 115 P.2d at 453. Kinnison cites Paramount Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Sacks,
107 N.J. Eq. 328, 152 A. 457 (1930), and Grannis-Blair Audit Co. v. Maddux, 167 Tenn. 297,
69 S.W.2d 238 (1938), in support of this point.
82. 18 Cal. 2d at 261-62, 115 P.2d at 453 (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 262, 115 P.2d at 453.
84. Id. at 263, 115 P.2d at 454.
85. Id.
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Thus, the court concluded the parties hardly could have intended the
assignment to be merely the transfer of a security interest.
Kinnison establishes that the characterization of an assignment as
absolute or for security pruposes will depend upon the intent of the
parties. The actual language used in the instrument in that case, how-
ever, provides little guidance because of the unique fact situation in-
volved. The assignment was made, not contemporaneously with the
deed of trust, but only after default under that deed of trust and as
partial satisfaction of the existing debt. It was primarily from these
facts, and not from the language of the instrument, that the court in-
ferred that the parties intended an absolute assignment.
8 6
Whether a particular clause constitutes an absolute assignment
was next considered in Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 87 in which the
supreme court found the following language to create an assignment
for security purposes: "[I]n case default is made by lessee. . . the les-
sor at its option may at any time. . . declare this lease terminated.
and may thereupon or at any time thereafter enter into and upon said
demised premises. . . and the lessee hereby waives in such event any
demand for the possession of said demised premises. ' 88 In deciding
that the clause did not constitute an absolute assignment, the court
failed to offer an explanation as to the elements of an absolute assign-
ment. Rather, the court said only that to be an absolute assignment
86. Id. Just one year after Kinnison, the court of appeal in Mortgage Guaranty Co. v.
Sampsell, 51 Cal. App. 2d 180, 124 P.2d 353 (1942), without discussion treated the following
assignment as one for security purposes: "[In the event of any breach or default by TRUS-
TOR in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby, or in the performance of any
obligation, covenant, promise or agreement in this Deed of Trust or in any note secured
thereby, or in the event of waste as defined herein, the BENEFICIARY shall be entitled, at
its option, without notice, either by itself or by a receiver to be appointed by a Court there-
for, and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness secureid hereby,
to enter upon and take possession of the property conveyed hereby, or any part thereof,
exclude TRUSTOR and all persons claiming under him, and do and perform any acts which
the TRUSTOR is obligated hereunder to do or perform, in such manner and to such extent
as may be necessary or proper to conserve the value of said property and protect the security
of this Deed of Trust, and collect and receive the rents, issues andprofits thereof and apply the
same, less costs of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon the in-
debtedness secured by this Deed of Trust, said rents, issues andprofits being hereby assigned to
the BENEFICIARY as further security for the payment of all indebtedness secured hereby."
Id. at 181-82, 124 P.2d at 353-54 (emphasis by the court). Mortgage Cruaranty considered
what a secured creditor must do to receive postdefault rents under an assignment of rents for
security purposes. See note 60 supra. Presumably because of the explicit language ("hereby
assigned. . . as further security"), neither party disputed the court's characterization of the
assignment clause as one for security purposes. Indeed, the case never mentions Kinnison at
all.
87. 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943).
88. Id. at 266, 143 P.2d at 698 (emphasis added). Childs involved a lease rather than a
deed of trust, but the language of the supreme court indicated that it treated the lease as it
would treat a deed of trust. See note 65 supra.
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there must be an "immediate transfer [as] distinguished from an ordi-
nary pledge of additional security" 89 and that such must be the "clearly
expressed intention" 90 of the parties.
The only in depth discussion by a California court of the require-
ments of an absolute assignment is contained in a 1964 appellate court
decision, Malsman v. Brandler.9' At issue was the effect of an assign-
ment of rents contained in a second deed of trust. The assignment in-
cluded the following language:
[Trustor] "grants, transfers and assigns" to the trustee, in trust, the
real property described. "Together with the rents, issues and profits
thereof, subject, however, to the right, power and authority given to
and conferred upon Beneficiary by paragraph 10 . . .to collect and
apply such rents, issues and profits ...
"(10) That as additional security, Trustor hereby gives to and
confers upon Beneficiary the right, power and authority . . . to col-
lect the rents, issues and profits of said property, reserving unto Trus-
tor the right, prior to any default by Trustor in payment of any
indebtedness secured hereby . . . to collect and retain such rents, is-
sues and profits as they become due and payable. Upon any such
default, Beneficiary may at any time without notice . .. enter upon
and take possession of said property. . . in his own name sue for or
otherwise collect such rents, issues and profits ...and apply the
same . . . upon any indebtedness secured hereby .... 92
On December 1, 1961, the trustor defaulted on a payment under the
deed of trust. On January 1, 1962, the trust deed beneficiary notified
the trustor of its default and demanded that the trustor pay to it any
rents collected from the encumbered property. The trustor nonetheless
continued to collect the rents for its own benefit until suit was filed and
a receiver appointed on March 27, 1962. The trial court held that the
assignment was for security purposes and that the beneficiary did not
elect to demand possession until it filed a complaint on March 27,
1962.93 Until this demand was made, the beneficiary's lien remained
unperfected. 94 The trustor therefore was allowed to retain all rents col-
lected prior to March 27, 1962. On appeal, the beneficiary contended
that under the terms of the second deed of trust it was entitled to the
rents as soon as the trustor defaulted, without having to take or de-
mand possession.
The court of appeal, citing Kinnison and Childs, recognized that
the parties to a trust deed may provide that rents are assigned abso-
89. 23 Cal. 2d at 268, 143 P.2d at 700.
90. Id.
91. 230 Cal. App. 2d 922, 41 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964). See generally Johnson, Assignment
of Rents: Malsman v. Brandler Makes Old Law, 40 L.A.B. BULL. 538 (1965).
92. 230 Cal. App. 2d at 924, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 440 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 923, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
94. See notes 52-65 & accompanying text supra.
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lutely to the beneficiary in the event of default and that such an assign-
ment, instead of pledging those rents as additional security,
automatically transfers the right to collect those rents upon default.95
The court held for several reasons, however, that paragraph (10) of the
trust deed was not a "clearly expressed intention" 96 of the parties that
the assignment be absolute. First, paragraph (10) contained no lan-
guage that specifically assigned the rents to the beneficiary, those rents
having previously been assigned to the trustee as security. Second, the
opening phrase of paragraph (10)-"[that as additional security"-
suggested an intent that the assignment be solely for security. Third,
the agreement stated that the trustor conferred the power to collect
rents upon the beneficiary subject to the trustor's right to collect those
rents prior to any default. This, the court said, does not indicate an
intent that the rents be assigned absolutely upon default, but merely
that upon a default the beneficiary may exercise the right to collection.
Similarly, the text of the trust deed taken as a whole indicated that the
beneficiary's power to collect rents could only be exercised after the
beneficiary had taken possession.9
7
95. 230 Cal. App. 2d at 923-24, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 439-40.
96. Id. at 925, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
97. Id. at 924-25, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 440-41. Two years after Malsman, the court of ap-
peal in Santacroce Bros. v. Edgewater-Santa Clara, Inc., 242 Cal, App. 2d 584, 51 Cal. Rptr.
613 (1966), encountered an assignment of rents clause which was almost identical to the one
in Malsman. Santacroce h'ros. arose out of a trustor's appeal from an order appointing a
receiver. Since the beneficiary had perfected its security interest in the rents by securing the
appointment of a receiver, see notes 52-65 & accompanying text supra, the court did not
have to face directly the question whether the assignment was absolute or for security. Ac-
cordingly, the assignment was presumed, without discussion, to be for security purposes.
The next year, in Lee v. Ski Run Apts. Assocs., 249 Cal. App. 2d 293, 57 Cal. Rptr. 496
(1967), the following unusual language was held to create an assignment of rents for security
purposes: "[T]he trustor grants in trust to the trustee certain described land in El Dorado
County 'together with all appurtenances in which Trustor has any interest, including water
rights benefiting said realty whether represented by shares of a company or otherwise; and
profits of said realty, reserving, however, the right to collect and use the same except during
continuance of default hereunder and during continuance of such default authorizing Bene-
ficiary to collect and enforce the same by any lawful means in the name of any party hereto.
For the purpose of securing: (I) Performance of each agreement of Trustor incorporated by
reference or contained herein; (2) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by one promissory
note of even date herewith in the principal sum of $65,000.00 payable to Beneficiary or
order, (3) the payment of any money that may be advanced by the Beneficiary to Trustor, or
his successors, with interest thereon.'" Id. at 296-97, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 499. At issue was the
right to postdefault rents collected by the trustor while it remained in possession. The court
stated that when the trust deed pledges the rents as additional security the trustor retains the
right to rents so long as it remains in possession. It then noted the language of Kinnison,
which established that an assignment of rents can be absolute upon the trustor's default, but
summarily concluded that "there is no such absolute assignment in this case." Id. at 297, 57
Cal. Rptr. at 499. The court gave no explanation why it considered the assignment of rents
clause to be for security purposes. Because of the court's failure to explain its conclusion
and because of the unusual and confusing language of the part of the trust deed which is
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The Elements of an Absolute Assignment
The above cases demonstrate that the California courts have not
precisely indicated the distinction between an absolute assignment of
rents and a pledge of rent for security purposes. Several factors none-
theless can be gleaned from the cases which help to distinguish the two.
First, there appears to be a presumption that assignment of rents
clauses create a security interest. If the parties intend the assignment to
be absolute, such an intent must be "clearly expressed."98 Presumably,
this can be done through the use of clear and absolute language in the
assignment clause. A statement such as "trustor hereby absolutely and
irrevocably assigns" should be sufficient. Second, if the term "as addi-
tional security" or its equivalent precedes the rents clause or in any way
modifies it, the assignment most likely will be deemed to be for security
purposes.99 Third, if the assignment of rents clause is contained in the
portion of the deed detailing the security agreement, it may be con-
strued as creating only a security interest."°° Therefore, the assignment
must be given a distinct heading and should be completely separate
from the listing of obligations secured by the deed of trust. Fourth, if a
portion of the deed first assigns the rents to the trustee as security, later
language conferring collection rights upon the beneficiary will be
subordinated. I0 ' Thus, probably no mention of rents whatsoever
should be made in the granting portion of the deed of trust.
The crucial factor, however, appears to be the requirement of tak-
ing possession. If the deed requires the beneficiary to take possession
or its equivalent before it becomes entitled to rents, the assignment
clause likely will be held to be for security purposes. 0 2 This is not
surprising because if the deed requires possession, distinguishing be-
tween the two types of assignment becomes moot. 10 3 The action that a
quoted by the court, Lee is not very instructive as to what distinguishes an absolute assign-
ment of rents from a pledge of those rents as security. The trust deed used the words "for
the purpose of securing" immediately following the clause discussing rents. This could indi-
cate that the rents were to be pledged as additional security. From the language quoted in
the opinion, however, it cannot be determined whether that phrase modifies the clause dis-
cussing rents or the entire agreement.
98. Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 268, 143 P.2d 697, 700 (1943). See
Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941); Malsman v.
Brandler, 230 Cal. App. 2d 922, 41 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964).
99. See Lee v. Ski Run Apts. Assocs., 249 Cal. App. 2d 293, 57 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1967);
Santacroce Bros. v. Edgewater-Santa Clara, Inc., 242 Cal. App. 2d 584, 51 Cal. Rptr. 613
(1966); Malsman v. Brandler, 230 Cal. App. 2d 922, 41 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964).
100. See Malsman v. Brandler, 230 Cal. App. 2d 922, 41 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964).
101. Id.
102. See Childs v. Shelburne Realty Co., 23 Cal. 2d 263, 143 P.2d 697 (1943); Lee v. Ski
Run Apts. Assocs., 249 Cal. App. 2d 293, 57 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1967); Malsman v. Brandler, 230
Cal. App. 2d 922, 41 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964).
103. See notes 52-72 & accompanying text supra.
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creditor must take to receive rents under the instrument is the same
action required to perfect a security interest in rents. Thus, to be an
absolute assignment, an assignment of rents clause should indicate that
the creditor is entitled to the rents without first having to take posses-
sion.
The trust deed in Aalsman read: "Upon. . . default, Beneficiary
may. . . enter upon and take possession of said property. . sue for
or otherwise collect such rents ... ."104 The court in Malsman inter-
preted this language as suggesting that the beneficiary's right to collect
rents was contingent upon its first taking possession. This indicates that
to be an absolute assignment, the right to rents and the right to post-
default possession should be separate and should be carefully distin-
guished. Any juxtaposition of the two suggests that possession is a pre-
requisite to the right to rents.
Because of the paucity of California case law establishing the re-
quirements for an absolute assignment of rents, a secured creditor at-
tempting to draft such an assignment cannot be certain of the label that
will be given to that clause by a court. Therefore, it is imperative that
the deed of trust contain all of the above elements.
Ventura-Louise
In a 1974 bankruptcy case, In re Ventura-Louise Properties,10 5 the
Ninth Circuit, applying California law, held an assignment of rents
clause in a deed of trust to be an absolute assignment. Relying solely
on the dictum in Kinnison,10 6 Ventura-Louise became the first case ac-
tually to find an absolute assignment of rents contained in a trust deed.
The interpretation of California law in Ventura-Louise is questionable,
however, because the language of the deed seemed to require that the
beneficiary take possession before being entitled to rents. 07 Nonethe-
less, Ventura-Louise is a significant case because it was the first decision
to establish that absolute assignments would be recognized in bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
Ventura-Louise involved a second trust deed, containing an assign-
ment of rents clause, under which the trustor defaulted. Shortly after
default, the lender notified each tenant on the encumbered property
that it was exercising its right to collect the rents under the assignment
of rents clause and demanded that all rents be paid to it. Six weeks
later the debtor filed a Chapter XII petition in bankruptcy. A trustee
was appointed who then notified all tenants that they were to pay rent
104. 230 Cal. App. 2d at 924, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 440 (emphasis added).
105. 490 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1974).
106. See notes 68-69 & accompanying text supra.
107. See text accompanying note 109 infra.
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to the trustee. The lender, to ensure that the tenants would not with-
hold rent because of conflicting demands for payment, agreed to let the
trustee collect the rents. During the bankruptcy proceeding the lender
took no steps to have the rents sequestered or otherwise collected for its
benefit. 0 8
Almost two years after filing of the petition, the property was sold
at a foreclosure sale, but the proceeds of the sale did not cover the
indebtedness. During this period the trustee collected some $75,000 in
rents. The lender claimed these rents under the assignment of rents
clause in the deed of trust. The bankruptcy court denied the claim and
the district court affirmed the denial. 10 9 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
characterized the case as presenting two issues: first, whether the as-
signment of rents clause was absolute or for security purposes only; and
second, if the assignment was for security purposes, whether the lender
had perfected its interest." l0 By deciding that the assignment was abso-
lute, the court never had to reach the second issue. The assignment of
rents clause provided:
B. Should Trustor fail . . . [to] do any act which he is obli-
gated hereunder to. . . do. . . then Trustee and/or Beneficiary each
in its sole discretion, it being hereby made the sole judge of the legal-
ity thereof, may...
1. [perform the obligation] in such manner and to such extent
as either may deem necessary to protect the security hereof, either
Trustee or Beneficiary being authorized to enter upon or take posses-
sion of said property for such purpose . . .
3. Beneficiary is authorized . . . to enter into and upon and
take and hold possession of any or all property covered hereby and
exclude the Trustor and all other persons therefrom; and may oper-
ate and manage the said property and rent and lease the same and
collect any rents, issues, income and profits therefrom, and from any
personal property located thereon, the same being hereby assigned and
transferredfor the beneft and protection of the Beneficiary .... I
The court first cited Kinnison for the proposition that an assign-
ment of rents in California may be either absolute or for security pur-
poses. It stressed that whether an assignment is absolute or for security
purposes is to be determined by the intent of the parties." 12 The court
expressly rejected the trustee's argument that the absolute assignment
discussed in Kinnison applied only where there is an immediate trans-
fer of the right to collect the rents. '13 The court then distinguished In re
108. 490 F.2d at 1142.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 1143.
111. Id. (emphasis by the court).
112. Id. at 1144.
113. Id.
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Hotel St. James Co.,"14 an earlier Ninth Circuit decision adjudicating a
beneficiary's right to rents in bankruptcy.
The beneficiary's claim to rents in Hotel St. James was denied,
explained the Ventura-Louise court, because it had failed to perfect its
security interest in the rents by taking possession. In Ventura-Louise,
on the other hand, the assignment of rents clause was held not to re-
quire possession: "Here the terms 'authorized to enter' and 'may oper-
ate and manage' are used as distinguished from the Hotel St. James'
clause which uses the term 'shall',--connotating a condition for perfect-
ing the security interest by entering into possession."" 15 Hotel St.
James was further distinguished because the rents clause in that case
did not use the term "assignment" which was used in Ventura-Lou-
ise. 16 In addition, the assignment language in Ventura-Louise was not
tempered by any express limitation such as the words "additional se-
curity" found in Malsman.117
The court's reasoning in holding that the assignment in Ventura-
114. 65 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1933). The clause involved in Hotel St. James stated:
"If one or more of the events of default shall happen, the Trustee. . . shall enter...
and take . . . possession of the trust estate . . . and may. . . operate. . . the estate, and
conduct the business thereof to the best advantage of the holders of the bonds secured
hereby ....
"The Trustee shall be entitled to the appointment of a receiver of the trust estate and of
the earnings, rents, dividends, income, interest and profits thereof. Id. at 84 (omis-
sions by the court).
115. 490 F.2d at 1144. Paragraph B.3. of the agreement involved in Ventura-Louise au-
thorized the beneficiary to "enter into. . . and hold possession. . . of [the] property...
and exclude the Trustor. . . therefrom; and may operate. . . [the] property and rent...
the same. . . [,] the same being hereby assigned and transferredfor the beneft andproteaion
of the Beneficiary." 490 F.2d at 1143 (emphasis in original). The text of the clause is quoted
in full at text accompanying note 111 supra. Paragraph B.3. contains two clauses. The first
allows the beneficiary, upon any breach by the trustor, to enter the property and exclude the
trustor. The second allows the beneficiary to operate and manage the property, rent and
lease the same, and collect any rents and profits therefrom. The language seems to indicate
that possession is required before the beneficiary is entitled to collect any rents. The second
clause is dependent on the first. The beneficiary must first enter the property and exclude
the trustor, and then may manage the property and collect the rents. If the right to operate
and manage the property and to collect the rents was not contingent upon the beneficiary's
first taking possession, the clauses would, presumably, not have been included in the same
paragraph.
Even if the clauses are construed as independent the second clause, standing alone,
requires possession as a prerequisite to obtaining rents. The right to rents is granted to the
beneficiary once it has begun to "operate and manage" the property. One cannot "operate
and manage" property without being in possession. Under California mortgage and deed of
trust law, when a trust deed beneficiary operates and manages property it is considered to be
in possession. See notes 62-72 & accompanying text supra. Thus, although the language of
the deed states that the beneficiary "may enter and manage," the right to rents is contingent
upon its first exercising the option of entering and managing by taking possession.
116. 490 F.2d at 1144.
117. See notes 89-95 & accompanying text supra.
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Louise was absolute is not persuasive. The opinion gives only a facile
explanation for its holding. Apparently, the rents clause was deemed
absolute because the court interpreted it not to condition the right to
rents upon taking possession and because the word "assignment" was
not expressly limited to encompass only a security interest. But the
court, except in one sentence distinguishing Hotel St. James, failed to
explain why it interpreted the language of the Ventura-Louise deed as
not first requiring possession. The two phrases from the Ventura-Lou-
ise clause quoted by the court in distinguishing Hotel St. James, "au-
thorized to enter"' 18 and "may operate and manage,"' 19 when read in
context, do not suggest that the beneficiary had the right to collect rents
prior to taking possession. Rather, they suggest only that the benefici-
ary had the customary rights of a trust deed beneficiary to enter for the
purpose of preventing waste and collecting postdefault rents.
The assignment language in Ventura-Louise is similar to that con-
tained in the deeds of trust considered in previous California cases. It
is almost identical to the provisions examined in Mortgage Guarantee
Co. v. Sampsell,120 Santacroce Bros. v. Edgewater-Santa Clara, Inc., 21
and Malsman v. Brand/er,122 all of which were held to be assignments
for security purposes only. The deeds involved in those cases also used
the word "assign." The only significant difference between those deeds
and the Ventura-Louise deed is that the latter lacked the modifying
words "as additional security." This difference is not dispositive. In
both Mortgage Guaranty and Santacroce Bros., the courts summarily
concluded that the rents were assigned for additional security so that
one cannot determine the extent, if any, to which the court relied on
this phrase in determining that the assignment was for security pur-
poses. Malsman, however, discussed the significance of this phrase
and, contrary to the assertion in Ventura-Louise, 23 considered it only
one factor indicating an intent that the rents be pledged as security. t24
Other factors mentioned in Malsman were not considered in Ven-
tura-Louise. The assignment clause in the entura-Louise deed was
contained in a part of the deed detailing the scope of the lender's secur-
ity interest. If an assignment of rents is not meant solely as a security
interest and is intended as an independent agreement, it presumably
should warrant a separate heading. In addition, unlike the Malsman
court, the court in Ventura-Louise failed to mention whether the
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 51 Cal. App. 2d 180, 124 P.2d 353 (1942).
121. 242 Cal. App. 584, 51 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1966).
122. 230 Cal. App. 2d 922, 41 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1964).
123. 490 F.2d at 1144.
124. See notes 93-100 & accompanying text supra.
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"granting" part of the trust deed granted the rents to the trustee in trust.
The court's cursory dismissal of Malsman and its failure to mention
other California cases is curious. Malsman is the leading California
case-indeed it is the only California case-that contains an analysis of
the requirements of an absolute assignment of rents.
Likewise curious is the court's use of innaposite authority. Hotel
St. James is an important case, but for a different point. Hotel St.
James did not attempt to distinguish between an absolute assignment
of rents, which was not recongized in California until eight years later,
and an assignment for security purposes.1 25 Rather, it considered only
the steps that a mortgagee must take to perfect a security interest in
rents.
The decision in Ventura-Louise is a questionable interpretation of
California law. It found an absolute assignment of rents in a clause
which seemed to require the beneficiary first to take possession. It ig-
nored all but one of the criteria mentioned in Malsman and attributed
to Kinnison a scope never attributed to that decision by the California
courts. Bankruptcy courts in California, faced with a creditor claiming
an absolute assignment of rents will be in the unfortunate position of
having to choose between applying California law and applying Ven-
tura-Louise. Nonetheless, Ventura-Louise remains the law in the Ninth
Circuit. Thus, an assignment of rents clause similar to the one in Ven-
tura-Louise may well constitute an absolute assignment in bankruptcy
proceedings in that Circuit. A secured creditor attempting to draft an
absolute assignment of rents is best advised, however, to fulfill all the
requirements of Malsman. If those requirements are met, a secured
creditor seems assured of having the assignment clause labeled abso-
lute. The Ninth Circuit in Ventura-Louise expressly recognized the effi-
cacy of such assignments in bankruptcy cases.
Perfecting an Assignment of
Rents in Bankruptcy Court
The secured creditor who has not obtained possession or the ap-
pointment of a receiver prior to institution of a bankruptcy case is re-
strained from doing so thereafter because of the automatic stay.126 In
125. The court also mentioned Associated Co. v. Greenhut, 66 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1933),
which held a rents clause to be an absolute assignment and consequently found that posses-
sion was not a prerequisite to the mortgagee's right to rents. In that case, the Third Circuit,
commenting in dictum on the law of New Jersey, said that an assignment was absolute upon
default. Id. at 429. The court gave no reasons why it considered the assignment to be abso-
lute, nor did it quote the language of the clause. Accordingly, it is difficult to see the rele-
vance of the case.
126. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
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Buner v. United States,12 7 however, a secured creditor was permitted to
perfect its lien on rents after the bankruptcy petition was filed by taking
action in the bankruptcy court that approximated the action it would
have had to take in state court to perfect that interest. Early Ninth
Circuit cases held that petitioning the bankruptcy court for sequestra-
tion of the rents was equivalent to demanding possession under state
law and thus, when granted, the sequestration order would perfect the
lien.' 28 Later cases held that certain actions less formal than the enter-
ing of a sequestration order would be sufficient for perfection.129 There
was thus some uncertainty about what actions were required under the
Act to perfect a lien on rents after filing. This uncertainty may be
mooted by the new Code which would seem to allow perfection by no-
tice.' 30 Nonetheless, the secured creditor is best advised to seek seques-
tration of the rents because it is the most certain method of perfecting
the lien.
Perfecting an Assignment for Security Purposes
The Ninth Circuit first determined what actions are required to
perfect a security interest in rents in In re Hotel St. James Co..' 3' Hotel
St. James involved a secured bondholder's claim for rents and profits
collected by a receiver and by a trustee in bankruptcy between the time
the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt and the foreclosure sale of the
property. The Ninth Circuit upheld the referee's decision to disallow
the claim. The trust indenture provided that if the debtor defaulted,
the indenture trustee could take possession of the property or secure a
receiver and thereafter would be entitled to the rents.132 The provision
was similar to that presently termed an assignment of rents for security
purposes.
The Ninth Circuit held that the bondholder was not entitled to the
rents under the terms of the indenture because it neither took posses-
sion or sought to have a receiver appointed before bankruptcy, nor did
it make any attempt after the bankruptcy petition was filed to have the
rents sequestered. 33 No claim for the rents was made until after the
foreclosure sale. The court noted the general rule that possession, ap-
pointment of a receiver, or a proper demand for possession is necessary
before a mortgagee can be entitled to the rents. 134 This rule will be
127. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). See notes 23-36 & accompanying text supra.
128. See, e.g., American Trust Co. v. England, 84 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1936).
129. See, e.g., Groves v. Fresno Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 373 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1967).
130. See text accompanying note 155 infra.
131. 65 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1933).
132. The language is quoted in note 112 supra.
133. 65 F.2d at 84.
134. Id. See Freedman's Sav. & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494 (1888).
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followed by the federal courts, the court pointed out, unless the state in
which the property is located would apply a different rule. 35 Califor-
nia, it noted, follows the general rule.136 Thus, since no action for pos-
sesion was taken by the secured creditor in Hotel St. James, that
creditor was not entitled to the rents.
The court then distinguished Mortgage Loan Co. v. Livingston,13
7
in which the Eighth Circuit had held that a secured creditor was enti-
tled to post-petition rents. The secured creditor in Livingston com-
menced an action for foreclosure before bankruptcy and would have
obtained possession but for the bankruptcy, two days after filing of the
petition. Immediately upon appointment of a receiver in bankruptcy,
the secured creditor petitioned for and obtained a sequestration of rents
from the property. Even after obtaining the order of sequestration, the
creditor "repeatedly thereafter asked leave to continue the enjoined
foreclosure."138
The brief opinion in Hotel St. James did not precisely indicate the
action a creditor must take after filing to be entitled to the rents. In
distinguishing Livingston, the Ninth Circuit only indicated that if a se-
cured creditor attempts to obtain possession of the property before the
institution of bankruptcy proceedings and obtains a sequestration of
the rents afterward, it will be entitled to the rents.'
39
Just three years later, in American Trust Co. v..England, 40 the
Ninth Circuit held that a demand for a sequestration of the rents fol-
lowed by a sequestration order is the equivalent of possession, thus en-
titling the secured creditor to the rents and profits. The mortgagee in
American Trust filed a petition for sequestration of the rents and profits
from a cattle ranch that was being operated by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy. The court quoted from Livingston at length and then mention-
ed Hotel St. James.14' Hotel St. James was distinguished because the
creditor in that case made no attempt to have the rents sequestered.1 42
The court held that such an attempt, if successful, is the equivalent of
taking possession and thus the creditor is entitled to all rents collected
from the date of its sequestration petition.143
American Trust was relied on by the Ninth Circuit in Groves v.
Fresno Savings & Loan Association, 44 in which the court held that
135. 65 F.2d at 84.
136. Id.
137. 45 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1930).
138. 65 F.2d at 85.
139. Id. at 84-85.
140. 84 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1936).
141. Id. at 357-58.
142. Id. at 358.
143. Id.
144. 373 F.2d 440 (9th Cir. 1967).
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actions less formal than a sequestration order can be deemed the
equivalent of possession under state law. The debtor in Groves filed a
Chapter XI petition. At the time of filing, the beneficiary of the first
trust deed had attempted to exercise its right to possession under the
assignment of rents clause by notifying the tenants to pay rents to its
agent appointed for that purpose. No rents were collected before the
commencement of the Chapter XI proceedings. Shortly after filing, the
beneficiary successfully petitioned the referee in bankruptcy to issue an
ex parte order allowing the beneficiary who had remained in posses-
sion of the property to continue collecting the rents but under account-
ability to the court. The trustee in bankruptcy sought a review of this
order. The referee found that the creditor had not taken possesion
before filing of the petition, but nevertheless held that the creditor was
entitled to the rents. 145
The referee's decision was vigorously disputed before the Ninth
Circuit by the bankruptcy trustee, who claimed that the creditor had
not taken the action required under state law to be entitled to the
rents.' 46 The court found it unnecessary to decide the question, how-
ever, since no rents were actually collected between the time the credi-
tor claimed to have taken possession and the time the referee issued the
exparte order allowing the creditor to collect the rents. 147 The latter
event, the court said, is the equivalent of ordering a sequestration of the
rents:
We think that the substantive effect of what the court did, whatever
label was attached to it, was to order the sequestration of the rents,
pursuant to the request for such an order contained in [the creditor's]
petition. . . . In [that] document it claimed to be entitled, under the
deed of trust, to collect the rents.148
A sequestration of the rents, the court noted, was held to be the
equivalent of possession under California law in American Trust.149
Two months after Groves, in Denco Development Co. v. Community
Savings and Loan Association, 50 the same court reached a similar con-
clusion. The secured creditor in Denco petitioned the referee for a se-
questration of the rents. At the hearing on the petition the court-
appointed receiver assured the creditor that the rents would be held for
the creditor's benefit and not made part of the the bankrupt's assets
available for unsecured creditors. Accordingly, a formal order of se-
questration was never entered. The foreclosure sale left a deficit and
the creditor sought the rents held by the receiver. The referee in bank-
145. See id. at 442.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 442-43.
150. 376 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1967).
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ruptcy held that the creditor was not entitled to the rents, but the dis-
trict court reversed that decision.151
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying solely on Livingston.' 52 The
court stressed that the parties all understood that the receiver was col-
lecting the rents for the benefit of the secured creditor. "As was said in
[Livingston] 'he was their receiver.' "153 Thus, the court held, the credi-
tor was in "constructive possession" of the property.
15 4
The Ninth Circuit has not been explicit in detailing what a creditor
must do after institution of bankruptcy proceedings to be entitled to
postpetition rents. Obtaining a sequestration of the rents is certainly
sufficient. Under certain circumstances receiving an equivalent assur-
ance from the court that the rents are being held for the secured credi-
tor's benefit also is sufficient. 55 To be safe a secured creditor should
insist on a specific order from the court stating that the rents are being
collected for the benefit of the creditor.
The Effect of the Code
The steps required to perfect an assignment of rents for security
purposes under the Act should be sufficient to perfect such an interest
under the new Code. Because the rule in Butner continues to be appli-
cable, 56 those steps in bankruptcy court which in the past have approx-
imated the necessary steps under state law will continue to do so.
Perfection of a security interest in rents may be easier under the Code,
however, because section 546(b) 15 7 appears to allow perfection by no-
tice. If this is so, the actual granting of a sequestration petition, or
some equivalent assurance by the court, would not be necessary to per-
fect the lien on rents; mere filing of the petition for sequestration would
suffice.
151. Seeid.at 549.
152. Id. at 552.
153. Id. at 551.
154. Id.
155. The approach taken by the Ninth Circuit is quite lenient compared to that taken by
other circuits. For instance, when Burner was decided in the Fourth Circuit, the court setv
very stringent standard for what it would require a mortgagee to do to approximate the
appointment of a receiver under North Carolina law. Golden Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States, 566 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1977). The Fourth Circuit required some formal action by
the mortgagee after institution of bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 1210-11. The Ninth Cir-
cuit's more lenient policy, however, should not be affected by Butner. In Butner, the
Supreme Court considered only the propriety of applying state law. It specifically declined
to consider what steps need be taken by the mortgagee after bankruptcy to approximate
appointment of a receiver in state court. 440 U.S. at 58. It thought that question better lefi
to lower court judges who are more familiar with questions of state law. Id. Butner, there-
fore, upholds the authority of these Ninth Circuit decisions.
156. See notes 37-50 & accompanying text supra.
157. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (Supp. 11 1978). See note 161 infra.
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The automatic stay provision of section 362158 is specifically made
subject to a creditor's postpetition right to perfect a lien pursuant to
section 546.159 Section 546 contains limitations on the trustee's avoid-
ing powers.' 60 The first sentence of subsection (b) of that section pro-
vides that those avoiding powers are subject to any state law that allows
perfection of a security interest in property to be valid against a person
who, before the time of perfection, had acquired rights in that prop-
erty.16' The second sentence of that subsection provides that if state
law requires seizure of property or commencement of an action to ac-
complish perfection, and the property has not been seized or the action
commenced prior to the date of the filing of the petition, perfection
may be obtained by notice within the time fixed by state law. '
62
Section 546(b) was directed primarily toward purchase money se-
curity interests under section 9-301(2) of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 163 Under section 9-301(2) a secured party has a ten day "grace
period" within which to perfect a purchase money security interest. 
64
Perfection within the ten day period enables a secured 'party to gain
priority over an intervening lien creditor or transferee in bulk. The
initial sentence of section 546(b) allows a creditor to perfect a security
158. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. 11 1978).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (Supp. 11 1978) provides that "Itlhe filing of a petition under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title does not operate as a stay . . . under subsection (a) of
this section, of any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights
and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title .
160. Id. § 546.
161. Section 546(b) provides: "The rights and powers of the trustee under section 544,
545, or 549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of
an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property
before the date of such perfection. If such law requires seizure of such property or com-
mencement of an action to accomplish such perfection, and such property has not been
seized or such action has not been commenced before the date of filing of the petition, such
interest in such property shall be perfected by notice within the time fixed by such law for
such seizure or commencement." Id.
162. Id.
163. U.C.C. § 9-301(2). Indeed, this is the only example of the intended effect of section
546(b) contained in the legislative history. See S. REP. No. 95-989, supra note 44, at 86;
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, supra note 44, at 371. Though the legislative history cites no other
examples, the § 9-301(2) situation could not have been envisioned as the sole instance where
this subsection would apply. The language is phrased as "any generally applicable law that
permits perfection." 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (Supp. 111978). Under many state laws other inter-
ests, such as assignment of rents clauses and mechanics' liens on real property, can convey
the rights which are covered by the language of the statute. See Kennedy, Automatic Stays
Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 3, 26-27 (1978).
164. "If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest before
or within 10 days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes priority over
the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise between the time the
security interest attaches and the time of filing." U.C.C. § 9-301(2). See generally R. HEN-
SON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 7.1 (2d ed. 1979).
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interest after filing in the event that bankruptcy intervenes prior to
perfection. Thus, a secured party does not lose the benefit of the ten
day grace period because of a bankruptcy filing.
Section 546(b), however, has broader application. Once an assign-
ment of rents is perfected, California law permits that assignment to be
effective against an entity that acquired rights in the real property
before the date of perfection but after the recording of the original deed
of trust.165 Hence the perfection of an assignment of rents falls within
the first sentence of section 546(b).
If the secured creditor has not perfected its assignment by taking
possession or having a receiver appointed at the time of the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy case, section 546(b) would appear to allow
perfection after commencement by the mere act of giving notice. The
statute, however, does not specify what constitutes notice for this pur-
pose. Nor does the definition of "notice and a hearing" in section
102166 provide any help. Presumably, any act that gives actual notice to
the court and to the trustee would be sufficient since approval of the
court is not required by the language of the statute. Such actual notice
could be given by the mere filing of a sequestration petition.
It seems likely, therefore, that under the Code a mere filing of a
petition for sequestration of the rents would be sufficient to perfect an
assignment of rents for security purposes at the moment it is filed. The
petition need not be granted. Nevertheless, because of the uncertainty
that any new law inevitably engenders, prudent lenders should con-
tinue to follow the steps that were sufficient under previous law. 167 The
165. See note 11 supra.
166. 11 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. 11 1978). This subsection provides rules of construction
applicable to the phrase "after notice and a hearing" or any similar phrase. The standard
for notice used in § 102 is simply that which is "appropriate in the particular circum'stances."
Id. What constitutes appropriate notice in particular circumstances is left to future judicial
construction.
167. The limitation on the trustee's avoiding powers contained in § 546(b) does not en-
compass the power to avoid preferential transfers under § 547. Consequently, the trustee
may seek to avoid as a preference the rents collected by a secured creditor or a receiver
within ninety days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Such an attempt would pres-
ent the interesting question of when a transfer of an interest in rents is deemed to occur for
purposes of a preference. There is, unfortunately, no uniform answer to this problem.
Subsection 547(e)(1)(A) defines the word perfection for purposes of preference litigation
and provides that "a transfer of real property other than fixtures. . . is perfected when a
bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits
such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the
transferee .... 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 111 978). Assignment of rents clauses
contained in deeds of trust routinely will satisfy this defintion since recording of the trust
deed prevents subsequent purchasers of the property from taking free and clear of the secur-
ity interest created by the deed. Thus, any properly recorded assignment of rents will be
perfected for purposes of § 547 even though the security interest in rents remains un-
perfected under state law. Accordingly, the transfer, for purposes of § 547, is deemed to take
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secured creditor not only should petition for sequestration of the
rents 168 but should vigorously seek to have that petition granted.
An Absolute Assignment
Ventura-Louise held that a secured creditor with an absolute as-
signment need take no postdefault action to perfect its interest in
rents. 169 The secured creditor was considered automatically entitled to
all postpetition rents collected by the trustee. The result in bankruptcy
place at the moment it takes effect between the parties since § 547(e)(2)(A) provides that a
transfer is made "at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the trans-
feree, !f such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time. Id. § 547(e)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). An assignment of rents takes effect between the parties upon execution of
the agreement; therefore, the date of transfer can be as early as the execution of the assign-
ment.
A problem, however, is raised by the final provision of § 547(e). Section 547(e)(3), to
which § 547(e)(2) is explicitly subject, provides that "[flor purposes of this section, a transfer
is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred." d. § 547(e)(3).
The right transferred under an assignment of rents clause presumably is the contractual right
to rents to which the trustor is or will be entitled as lessor or landlord. Such a conclusion
was reached under the Act by Judge A. Hand in Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F.2d 892, 893
(2d Cir. 1942). Thus, for preference purposes, the transfer of an interest in rents cannot
occur until the trustor has a right to rents from the underlying property, ie., at the time it as
lessor executes a lease covering that property. Until this moment the trustor has no rights in
the property which the assignment clause putatively transferred. Nor can it be said that the
trustor acquires rights in the rents only as the rents become due under the lease. When a
lease is signed the lessor has a contractual right to rents which may be assigned.
Application of § 547(e)(3) can often lead to an anomolous result. For instance, if the
property involved were a shopping center, the assignment of rents might cover dozens of
leases entered into at various points in time. If the lender took possession and collected rents
before filing of a petition in bankruptcy, the portion of those rents attributable to leases
entered into within ninety days before filing would be voidable as a preference. Thus, part
of the rents collected by the lender would amount to a preference and part would not. This
result, although awkward, seems mandated by strict application of the language of the stat-
ute.
A more serious problem for lenders arises where the debtor receives rents pursuant to
month to month rental agreements rather than leases. Since the right to rent arises each
month as the rental payment becomes due, rather than upon execution of the rental agree-
ment, it seems that the debtor has no transferrable right until each rent payment accrues.
Thus, it is likely that a trustee will be able to avoid as a preference all rents collected by the
creditor in possession, the right to which accrued within ninety days before bankruptcy.
Note that for preference purposes it is immaterial whether an assignment clause is
deemed to be absolute or for security purposes as both satisfy the definition of perfection
contained in § 547(e)(l)(A).
168. There is, in addition, an entirely distinct reason for having the rents sequestered. If
the rents are labeled cash collateral, see note 170 infra, then they must be sequestered or
otherwise accounted for by the trustee. II U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (Supp. 11 1978). By petitioning
for sequestration of the rents the secured creditor not only can be assured of perfecting its
lien on the rents, but also can be assured that the trustee is performing its duty to segregate
cash collateral.
169. See notes 103-12 & accompanying text supra.
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court thus should be that no further action is required to be taken. As
noted earlier, however, there is uncertainty in California law regarding
this question.17 0 Butner requires an approximation of the result that
would be reached under state law. Yet it is not known whether Califor-
nia courts would grant a perfected security interest in rents to the se-
cured creditor who took no action, even if that creditor held what was
labeled an absolute assignment. It is wise, therefore, for all secured
creditors to take the same steps necessary to perfect an assignment for
security purposes. The trustee is likely to argue that some action is
necessary to perfect this interest. To forestall this contention and to be
assured of a right to the rents, the secured creditor should seek to have
the rents sequestered.
Conclusion
The effect of an assignment of rents clause in a bankruptcy case
can vary considerably.' 71 Nonetheless a few general rules can be estab-
lished. Butner v. United States directs that state law will determine the
validity and scope of security interests in postpetition rents. California
recognizes two types of security interests that may be included in a trust
deed-an assignment of rents for security purposes and an absolute as-
signment of rents.
A secured creditor who has an assignment of rents for security
purposes becomes entitled to those rents as soon as it takes possession
or secures the appointment of a receiver. 7 2 Once in possession, it can
collect all accrued but uncollected rents and all rents accruing while it
remains in possession. If a bankruptcy case is filed before the secured
170. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
171. "The one area of the use of collateral problem that has been substantially litigated
is the one of rents accruing from encumbered real estate during the pendency of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. The case results, unfortunately, have hardly been illuminating. They go
off in every direction, and while it is possible to discern a few basic rules, a case may be
found in support of virtually every proposition that someone wishes to advance." P. MUR-
PHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 7.13 (1980).
172. A creditor who is in possession nevertheless may be ousted by the trustee. Section
542 requires that entities in control of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under
§ 363 must deliver and account for such property to the trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (Supp. II
1978). Property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under § 363 is "property of the estate"
as defined in § 541. Id. § 363(b). Section 541 contains a broad description of what consti-
tutes property of the estate: "All legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property." Id.
§ 541(a)(1). The subject property likely will be considered property of the estate even if the
debtor is no longer in possession. Prior to a foreclosure sale the debtor retains certain rights
in the property even if it has lost the right to possession and to collect rents. As long as the
debtor retains some rights it seems likely that the property will be considered to come within
the expansive scope of § 541. If it does, the creditor becomes obligated to turn over the
property to the trustee. If a receiver is in possession a similar result will be reached under
§ 543.
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creditor has perfected its lien and becomes entitled to the rents, the
creditor must file a complaint in the bankruptcy court to modify or
terminate the automatic stay of section 362 and to have the rents se-
questered or otherwise set aside for its benefit. If granted, the creditor
in a straight bankruptcy will prevail over the debtor and over the
trustee seeking the rents for the benefit of unsecured creditors.
73
The absolute assignment of rents presents a more difficult situa-
tion. Until Ventura-Louise, rights from an absolute assignment of rents
were largely theoretical and were acknowledged only in dictum; their
practical effect was unexplored. Although the result in Ventura-Louise
is clear, it is based on a questionable interpretation of state law. The
holding in that case should not be relied upon by secured creditors. A
prudent creditor should take nothing for granted and should seek to
173. Section 363 allows the trustee to use, sell, or lease property of the estate under
certain circumstances. The Code makes a distinction between property of the estate which is
cash collateral and that which is not cash collateral. Cash collateral cannot be used, sold, or
leased by the trustee in the ordinary course of business unless each entity with an interest in
the collateral consents or the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes the trustee's pro-
posed action. Id. § 363(c)(2). If use, sale, or lease of the cash collateral is authorized, the
court must provide "adequate protection" for any entity with an interest in the collateral.
Id. § 363(e). Adequate protection is defined somewhat vaguely in § 361. If the trustee does
not propose to use, sell, or lease cash collateral or the court refuses to authorize the trustee's
proposed use, sale, or lease, then the trustee is under a duty to segregate and account for any
cash collateral under his or her control. Id. § 363(c)(4). Property of the estate which is not
cash collateral, in contrast, can be used, sold, or leased by the trustee in the ordinary course
of business without notice and a hearing. Id. § 363(c)(1). Nor is the trustee under any duty
to segregate and account for property which is not cash collateral. Thus, from a creditor's
point of view a lien on cash collateral is preferable to a lien on property of the estate which is
not cash collateral.
A creditor possessing an assignment of rents clause will want to contend that rents be-
ing collected from the subject property come within the defintion of cash collateral. If the
interest in rents is perfected under state law the creditor should be successful. Section 363(a)
defines cash collateral as "cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title, securities, de-
posit accounts, or other cash equivalents in which the estate and an entity other than the
estate have an interest." Id. § 363(a). Rents obviously qualify as cash; the only point of
issue would be whether the creditor "has an interest" in those rents. If a creditor has an
absolute assignment it should have an interest in rents regardless of whether it has taken any
action after default. The assignment, being absolute, transferred a present interest in rents.
In theory, no further action on the creditor's part is necessary for it to be entitled to the rents.
Therefore, rents received by the trustee which are subject to an absolute assignment should
automatically be considered cash collateral.
Rents collected by the trustee which are subject to an assignment for security purposes
are more problematic. The assignment for security purposes creates only an inchoate lien
which must be perfected before it is effective. Prior to perfection it is open to question,
therefore, whether a creditor has an interest in the rents. The creditor could contend that the
lien, even though prospective, is sufficient to meet the broad defintion of "lien" contained in
§ 101(28). Id. § 10 1(28). If the assignment for security purposes qualifies as a lien then the
creditor would seem to "have an interest" in the rents. Nevertheless, a court may decide
otherwise since the interest is not effective until it is perfected. To be careful, therefore, the
creditor should perfect the assignment as soon as possible after filing.
[Vol. 31
July 19801 ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS 1467
have the rents sequestered. Petitioning for sequestration to enforce
rights under an absolute assignment rather than merely to perfect a
security interest is safer than arguing that a particular assignment
clause is absolute or that an absolute assignment need not be perfected.
If the rents are sequestered, the distinction between an assignment for
security purposes and an absolute assignment becomes meaningless.

